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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze the Kang-Park and ESS-FH scheme, and propose an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management 
Scheme for FPMIPv6 (ESS-FP). Based on the CGA method and public key Cryptography, ESS-FP provides a strong key exchange 
and key independence, in addition to improving the weaknesses of Fast Handover for Proxy Mobile IPv6 (FPMIPv6). We formally 
verify the proposed scheme based on BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) Logic, and analyze and compare its handover latency 
with those of the Kang-Park scheme and ESS-FH. In addition, we propose an inter-domain fast handover scheme for PMIPv6, 
using the proxy-based FPMIPv6. Furthermore, we apply an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 
in the Internet of Things (IoT) environments. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, broadband wireless networks have rapidly evolved towards all-IP networks. Due to the quick 
growth in the number of Internet users in the wireless environment, the issue of IP mobility management technology 
has become more and more important. For this reason, research is being carried out to enhance flow mobility 
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management. Mobility management enables the serving networks to locate a point of attachment of a Mobile Node 
(MN) for delivering data packets, and to maintain an MN’s connection, as it continues to change its point of attachment. 
After many papers and much research, the IETF NETLMM working group has proposed Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) 
as a local mobility management protocol1. PMIPv6 introduces a new entity, called a Mobility Access Gateway (MAG), 
which acts as a relay node between an MN and a Local Mobility Agent (LMA). The MAG performs the mobility-
related signaling with the LMA on behalf of the MN. Although the signaling between the MN and the network can be 
saved, PMIPv6 still has the same drawback as MIPv6. That is, during the PMIPv6 handover execution, there is a 
period when the MN experiences a service break, due to the PMIPv6 protocol operations. To reduce the handover 
latency, it has been suggested that the Fast MIPv6 (FMIPv6) solution specified in be applied to PMIPv62. However, 
Fast Handover for PMIPv6 (FPMIPv6) suffers from the problem of false handover initiation, since in fast handovers, 
the serving MAG predicts which MAG the MN will move to, with the help of Layer 2 (L2) triggers3. 
Despite the best efficiency, without being secure for signaling messages, PMIPv6/FPMIPv6 is vulnerable to various 
security threats, such as Denial of Service (DoS) or redirect attacks, and it does not support global mobility between 
PMIPv6. Recently, Kang and Park, and You, Lee, Sakurai and Hori proposed the Kang-Park Scheme and ESS-FH 
(Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for Fast Handover)4,5, to secure the signaling message in the 
FH-HMIPv6 environment. In this paper, we analyze its method, and then propose an Enhanced Security and Inter-
Domain Scheme for FPMIPv6 (ESS-FP)6. Based on the Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) method7 and 
the public key cryptography, ESS-FP provides strong key exchange and key independence, in addition to improving 
the weaknesses of FPMIPv6. Furthermore, in order to improve the security and efficiency of communication in the 
Internet of things, we apply an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 in the IoT 
environment. Specially, the mobile nodes may move together with human or vehicles in Internet of Thing (IoT)8. As 
a result, the mobile nodes have limited resources such as battery power, computing capability and memory9. Also, the 
current state of Internet of Things security seems to take all the vulnerabilities from existing spaces, e.g. network 
security, application security, mobile security, and Internet-connected devices. Specifically, identify three key 
research challenges in detecting Sybil attacks in the IoT. A Sybil attack is a security threat where an attacker employs 
a false/forged identity to gain unauthorized access to a secure system10. We formally verify the proposed scheme based 
on BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) Logic, and analyze and compare its handover latency with that of the Kang-
Park scheme and ESS-FH. In addition, this paper proposes an inter-domain fast handover scheme for PMIPv6, using 
proxy-based FMIPv6 (FPMIPv6). In conclusion, we believe that the security scheme properly harmonizes, and 
advances the inter-domain handover with PMIPv6/FPMIPv6, which are important goals. 
2. Enhanced Security Mobility Management 
In this section, the proposed ESS-FP is introduced. This is the Enhanced Security and Inter-Domain Scheme for 
Fast Handovers for Proxy Mobile IPv6, called ESS-FP. For security purposes, ESS-FP makes use of the CGA method 
and public key cryptography to provide a strong key exchange, as well as key independence. Furthermore, we apply 
an ESS-FP scheme for the Internet of things based on the CGA method and public key Cryptography. With its 
superiority in efficiency and security, ESS-FP proves to be more suitable for resource-restricted environment in IOT 
and better satisfies the requirement of secure scheme in IoT. i.e. MAG negotiates a secret key ‘Kbm’ with the LMA, 
whenever moving to the LMA domain. For this ‘Kbm’ negotiation, the public-key cryptography is applied in 
conjunction with the CGA method7. Based on the ‘Kbm’, ESS-FP achieves a seamless integration between fast 
handover and local binding update. Moreover, it allows the MN to continually execute a fast handover, even between 
different LMA domains. We also proposed an inter-domain handover scheme for Proxy Mobile IPv6, and when the 
mobile node leaves this domain, the mobility support breaks. In addition, when a MN detects that it is entering a new 
sensor and communicate from a sensor to MN using Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over Datagram 
Transport Layer Security (DTLS). CoAP is being standardized as an application layer protocol for the IoT. CoAP 
proposes to use DTLS to provide end-to-end security to protect the IoT11. 
Signaling message must be included with the security mechanism, during the handover process within a PMIPv6 
domain. If not, it is vulnerable to various attacks, such as Session Hijacking (SSH), Malicious Mobile Node Flooding 
(MMF), Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks4,5. For security reasons, the Authentication, 
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server was used, as well as the security protocol in PMIPv6. But it was 
588   Hyun-Suk Chai et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  56 ( 2015 )  586 – 591 
primarily directed at mobile node certification to secure support. We will also discuss some problems in previous 
authentication mechanisms associated with PMIPv6, and propose a new security mechanism through secret keys 
between MN and MAG. MAG and LMA are used to perform a secure handover with a security association (SA). 
Additionally, ESS-FP can support a global mobility management in PMIPv6.  
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Fig. 1. Initial Architecture of the proposed scheme 
The initial access authentication process is initiated as shown in Fig. 1. ESS-FP is composed of four phases: the 
initialization, predictive and reactive mode of intra-handover, and inter-handover phases. The initialization phase is 
only executed once by an MN during its bootstrapping stage, or during its movement from the home network. In this 
phase, the MN negotiates a secret key with its current LMA, while performing the local binding update. After this 
phase, if the MN moves to a new network, the predictive and reactive mode of the intra-handover phase or the inter-
handover phase is performed, depending on the type of handover. This paper proposes a security scheme to protect 
PMIPv6 and FPMIPv6. In this scheme, AAA infrastructure is used to authenticate an MN, while exchanging a session 
key with it. Also, the LMA uses the group key and the ticket, to distribute the session key to its MAGs. In addition, 
each involved entity (i.e., MN or MAG or LMA) uses a CGA as its source address, and signs signaling messages with 
the private key corresponding to this CGA. In this way, ESS-FP verifies each entity’s address ownership and public 
key, while using public key cryptography for both the handover key exchange, and the message protection, without 
any security infrastructure. More importantly, the scheme achieves seamless harmony with PMIPv6 and FPMIPv6. 
This paper discusses the use of CoAP11 over DTLS12 for sensor to MN (S2M) communication in IoT for supervision 
of the environmental conditions during transport. The MN sends to sensor for initial request message and creates a 
secure tunnel with the CoAP over DTLS. If the secure channel is successfully created, then the MN sends next message 
to the MAG.  
3. Performance Evaluation 
This chapter compares and analyzes the handover latency for the proposed scheme, existing Kang-Park scheme, 
and ESS-FH scheme. Proposed scheme models the mobility of MN using the 2-dimensional Markov Chain model of 
the Random-Walk mobility model14. In this model, the next location becomes an arbitrary value to the earlier location. 
This arbitrary value is a value independently selected from the distribution. In addition, when the probability that the 
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MN stays in the network is P, the probability to move to another network is 1-P. Table 1 represents the parameter 
values for performance evaluation. 
Table 1. Parameter values 
Parameter Description Values 
( )MN pMAG pARt   Transmission time between MN and pMAG(pAR) 12 
( )MN nMAG nARt   Transmission time between MN and nMAG(nAR) 12 
( ) ( )pMAG pAR nMAG nARt   Transmission time between pMAG(pAR) and nMAG(nAR) 20 
( ) ( )pMAG pAR nLMA nMAPt   Transmission time between pMAG(pAR) and nLMA(pMAP or HA) 20 
( ) ( )nMAG nAR nLMA nMAPt   Transmission time between nMAG(nAR) and nLMA(nMAP) 20 
( )nLMA nMAP HAt   Transmission time between nLMA(nMAP) and HA 40 
( ) ( )pLMA pMAP nLMA nMAPt   Transmission time between pLMA(pMAP) and nLMA(nMAP) 40 
MN AAAt   Transmission time between NM and AAA for authentication 40 
( )MAG AR AAAt   Transmission time between MAG(AR) and AAA for authentication 40 
( )LMA MAP AAAt   Transmission time between LMA (MAP) and AAA for authentication 40 
MinInt  Minimum time allowed between sending unsolicited MN messages 30 
MaxInt  Maximum time allowed between sending unsolicited MN messages 70 
ReTranceT  Neighbor Solicitation (NS) retransmission time 1000 
DADTrance  Duplicate address detection time 1 
 
Handover latency represents the registration process and authentication process, where MN delivers the Report 
message to Access Router (AR), and receives the Reply message back from MAG. For handover analysis, the 
handover latency in the initial access authentication process and the handover latency in the handover authentication 
process can be obtained. First, we notate the handover latency of the existing studies in the initial access authentication 
process as 
( )KP
Initial HOL  , 
( )ESS FH
Initial HOL

 , and equations (1) and (2), and notate the initial access latency of the proposed scheme as 
( )SA FP
Initial HOL

  and equation (3).  
( ) ( ) Re 3 2( )
4
KP
Initial HO MN AR AR MAP MAP HA
MinInt MaxIntL transTimer DADTransmits t t t   
  u                                            (1) 
( ) ( ) Re 3 2( )
4
ESS FH
Initial HO MN AR AR MAP MAP HA
MinInt MaxIntL transTimer DADTransmits t t t   
  u                                      (2) 
( ) ( ) 2
4
ESS FP
Initial HO MAG LMA MN AAA
MinInt MaxIntL t t  
  
                                                                                                     (3) 
Equation (3) is the initial access and handover latency of general PMIPv6, which is divided into the latency when 
MN is recognized, and the time to register MN to the local network ( 2 MAG LMAt  ). Next, we notate the handover latency 
within the domain with equations (4) and (5). 
( ) 2KPIntra HO MN ARL t                                                                                                                                                 (4) 
( ) ( )ESS FH KP
Intra HO Intra HOL L

                                                                                                                                                 (5) 
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There is latency in the interval NMAG, which is recognized by MN, and latency for the binding update between 
NMAG and LMA. 
( ) ( )KP KP
Inter HO Initial HOL L                                                                                                                                                  (6) 
( ) ( )ESS FH ESS FH
Inter HO Intra HOL L
 
                                                                                                                                                 (7) 
We evaluated the performance using a graph, based on the mathematically analyzed equation and except that 
connectivity using phase of CoAP evaluated because performance suffered in the common process case. We based 
the value of the mediator set up in the simulation on the assumptions made in relevant studies by Kong and Han14,15,16.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison in Handover Latency (left) and Comparison of Handover Latencies According to Increase of Frequency in Inter-Domain 
Movement (right). 
Fig. 2 (left) shows a graphic comparison the handover latency of the proposed ESS-FP scheme and conventional 
schemes. The proposed scheme is shown to be better than the conventional schemes in the initial authentication 
process, and the inter-domain handover authentication process. Fig. 2 (right) shows the results using equations (8), 
(9), and (10), which mathematically analyzed the handover latencies for increases in the frequency of movement 
among domains. Since general PMIPv6 does not support inter-domain handover, the proposed inter-domain handover 
and conventional scheme for handover latencies are compared. Latencies increase rapidly, based on the increase in 
the KP-FHMIPv6 inter-domain handover. This occurs because FHMIPv6 has time for binding update to earlier HA, 
which is different from the proposed ESS-FPMIPv6 inter-domain handover. In addition, since the proposed ESS-
FPMIPv6 scheme is relatively less affected by wireless interval latency, when the inter-domain handover is applied, 
the handover latency is very small compared to conventional schemes; high speed handover is possible, even during 
long-distance movement. 
4. Conclusion  
Various methods to improve the mobility performance in MIPv6 are currently being developed. Among them, 
PMIPv6 has been widely studied after the completion of RFC standards in 2008, in order to complement the 
shortcomings of wasting countless signaling that can take place in MIPv6, FMIPv6, and HMIPv6, which are host-
based mobility support technologies. Although PMIPv6 reduces the problem of interference between wireless signals 
by dramatically decreasing the number of signals by MN, and securing stable transfer speed by expanding the wire 
interval, it does not support inter-domain handover. In regard to security, many different schemes have been proposed 
to protect signaling messages; but to protect PMIPv6 signaling messages, most conventional schemes are based on an 
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AAA server. In this study, a new CGA scheme based on an AAA protocol and public key to protect PMIPv6/FPMIPv6 
based signaling messages using security analysis of handover schemes for proxy mobile network in the IoT 
environment is developed, which improves the mobility and stability. In addition, a new inter-domain handover is 
proposed that conventional PMIPv6 cannot support. Here we also present its architecture and messages formats and 
evaluate its performance by analyzing handover latency. The authentication protocol is also evaluated through BAN-
Logic, a logic tool17; and a higher security is achieved through a message security mechanism involving signaling, 
after a consistent transfer speed is secured based on PMIPv6 and network-based mobility support technology, by 
modeling mobility through a Markov chain model. 
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